------ # Network Centric Warfare **Written By:** - David S. Alberts - John J. Garstka - Frederick P. Stein **See:** Alberts_NCW.pdf --------- ## Endnotes 1 VAdm Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, and John J. Garstka, “Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” Proceedings of the Naval Institute 124:1 (January 1998): 28–35. 2 Adm Jay L. Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), USN, in his address at the U.S. Naval Institute Annapolis Seminar and 123rd Annual Meeting, in Annapolis, Maryland, on April 23, 1997, said the military is in the midst of “a fundamental shift from what we call platform-centric warfare to something we call network-centric warfare.” 3 U.S. Air Force, The Army Air Forces in World War II—Vol. I: Plans and Operations, January 1939–August 1942 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 597–611. 4 U.S. Air Force, The Army Air Forces in World War II—Vol. III: Europe: Argument to VE Day, January 1944–May 1945 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 49. 5 Richard Hough and Denis Richards, The Battle of Britain (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1989). 6 Stephen C. Mooney, The Cyberstate (Denver, CO: ACM, Inc., 1996). 7 Robert G. Phelan, Jr. and Michael L. McGinnis, “Reengineering the United States Army’s Tactical Command and Control Operational Architecture for Information Operations,” Proceedings of the 1996 Winter Simulation Conference, 1996. 8 Richard Saul Wurman, Information Anxiety (New York: Bantam Books, 1990). 10 M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Chaos (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 259– 260. 11 Peter Newcomb, “The First Billion Takes a Lifetime...Except in the Internet Age,” Forbes 163:8 (April 19, 1999): 246–247. 12 T. X. Hammes, “War Isn’t a Rational Business,” Proceedings of the Naval Institute 124:7 (July 1998): 22–25. 13 U.S. Department of Commerce, “IT Industries—Of Growing Importance to the Economy and Jobs,” Appendix 1 in The Emerging Digital Economy (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office). 14 Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (New York: Free Press, 1985). 15 Charles B. Stabel, et al., “Configuring Value for Competitive Advantage: On Chains, Shops, and Networks,” Strategic Management Journal 19 (1998), 413–437. 16 “George Gilder’s Telecosm: Metcalfe’s Law and Legacy,” Forbes ASAP 152: Supplement (September 1993), 158–166. Metcalfe’s Law is named after Robert Metcalfe, who invented the staple networking topology, Ethernet. Metcalfe’s Law of the telecosm states that the potential value of a network is “n” squared, with “n” being the number of nodes on the network. 17 CIO Imperative: Business Results Are the End—Information Sharing Is the Means, The Concours Group, 1997. 18 Don Tapscott, The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked Intelligence (New York: McGraw–Hill, 1996), 143–152. 19 Karl Sabbagh, Twenty-First Century Jet: The Making and Marketing of the Boeing 777 (New York: Scribner, 1996). 20 Carl W. Stern, “The Deconstruction of Value Chains,” Perspectives, The Boston Consulting Group, September 1998. 21 Karl Sabbagh, Twenty-First Century Jet: The Making and Marketing of the Boeing 777 (New York: Scribner, 1996). 22 Capitalizing on Innovation, Capital One’s 1998 Debt Equity Conference, October 20, 1998. 23 www.dell.com 24 Joan Magretta, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s Michael Dell,” Harvard Business Review 76:2 (March–April 1998), 72–84. 25 www.compaq.com 26 Don Tapscott, The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked Intelligence (New York: McGraw–Hill, 1996), 84, 101, 131. 27 Ibid. 28 “The Leaders in 1997 Sales and Profits,” Business Week 3567 (March 2, 1998), 110. 29 James F. Moore, The Death of Competition: Leadership and Strategy in the Age of Business Ecosystems (New York: HarperBusiness, 1996), 161–188. 30 Christopher Palmeri, “Believe in Yourself, Believe in the Merchandise,” Forbes 160:5 (September 8, 1997), 118–124. 31 Frank Swoboda, “Talking Management with Chairman Welch,” The Washington Post (March 23, 1997, Section H: Business), 1, 7. 32 John Foley, “Squeezing More Value from Data,” Information Week (December 9, 1996), 44. 33 Matthew Schifrin and Erika Brown, “Merrill’s Malaise,” Forbes 163:7 (April 5, 1999), 108–114. 34 Merrill Lynch Site Visits, August 11, 1997 and October 28, 1997. 35 Seth Schiesel, “The No. 1 Customer: Sorry It Isn’t You,” The New York Times (November 23, 1997, Section 3: Money & Business), 1, 10. 36 Interviews with Christopher J. Carroll, Managing Director, Head of Global Electronic Trading, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, Inc., 1996–1997. 37 VAdm Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, “Network Centric Warfare: An Emerging Military Response to the Information Age,” Presentation to the 1999 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 29, 1999. 38 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995); David S. Alberts, Operations Other Than War: The Technological Dimension (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995); Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996); Tom Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998); Larry Wentz, Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998); Martin C. Libicki, What Is Information Warfare? (Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1995); and Martha Maurer, Coalition Command and Control: Key Considerations (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994). 39 David S. Alberts, Command and Control in Peace Operations, \[report on “Western Hemisphere Experience in Global Peace Operations,” the third of a series of reports of workshops organized by the INSS Center for Advanced Command Concepts and Technology (ACTS)\] (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995). 40 Ibid. 41 Martin C. Libicki, What Is Information Warfare? (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995). 42 Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libicki, “DBK and Its Consequences,” in Dominant Battlespace Knowledge (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 34. 43 Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995). 44 Joseph A. Welch, Jr., “State of the Art of C2 Assessment,” Proceedings for Quantitative Assessment of the Utility of Command and Control System, MTR 80W00025 (January 1980), 11. 45 For details on Lawson’s model, see “Naval Tactical C3 Architecture, 1985–1995,” Signal 33:10 (August 1979), 71–72. 46 For details, contact Evidence Based Research, Inc., at www.ebrinc.com 47 Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense, revised edition (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996). 48 Interviews with RAdm Charles R. McGrail, USN (Ret.), 1996- 1998. 49 Larry Wentz, Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998). 50 Pascale Combelles Siegel, Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998). 51 Manuel de Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (New York: Zone Books, 1991); John T. Dockerty and A. E. R. Woodcock, The Military Landscape: Mathematical Models of Combat (Cambridge, UK: Woodhead, 1993); Murray Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar (New York, W.H. Freeman, 1994); John Gore, Chaos, Complexity, and the Military (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996); Glenn E. James, Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications Newport Paper 10 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1996); and Edward N. Lorenz, The Essence of Chaos (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1993). For more, see David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, “Working Bibliography,” Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), 333–381. 52 David S. Alberts, Lessons Learned from ISX 1.1, AIAA Joint Experiment Task Force Briefing, January 28, 1999. 53 Knowledge and Speed: The Annual Report on the Army After Next Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army, July 1997. 54 Executive Summary of Global ’98 Wargame, Naval War College, Newport, RI, July 13–31, 1998. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 David A. Fulghum, “Improved Air Defenses Prompt Pentagon Fears,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 149:1 (July 6, 1998), 22–24. 59 VAdm Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, and John J. Garstka, “Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” Proceedings of the Naval Institute 124:1 (January, 1998), 28–35. 60 Adm Jay L. Johnson, CNO, USN, Address at the U.S. Naval Institute Annapolis Seminar and 123rd Annual Meeting, Annapolis, MD, April 23, 1997. 61 David S. Alberts, The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), 35–36. 62 Executive Summary of Global ’98 Wargame, Naval War College, Newport, RI, July 13–31, 1998. 63 Ibid. 64 Gen. Charles A. Horner, USAF (Ret.), “Comments on Expeditionary Force Experiment ‘98,” C2 Earlybird: Special Edition EFX ‘98 Lessons Learned 1: Special Ed.1 (December 1998). 65 Robert M. Nutwell, “IT-21 Provides Big ‘Reachbacks’,” Proceedings of the Naval Institute 124:1 (January 1998), 36– 38. 66 Adm Jay L. Johnson, CNO, USN, CNO Address at AFCEA West, San Diego, CA, January 21, 1998. 67 R. Thomas Goodden, et al., Education Technology in Support of Joint Professional Military Education in 2010: The EdTech Report (Washington, DC: A Joint Staff Publication, October 1998). 68 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Common Operational Modeling, Planning, and Simulation Strategy (COMPASS), Version 1.1, JWID Joint Project Office, August 31, 1998. 69 In addition to sensor, decision maker, and actor entities that work together to achieve and utilize battlespace awareness, there are supporting entities that structure the flow of material and systems that process battlespace information. 70 A common operational picture does not imply that everyone in the battlespace sees exactly the same thing, in the same way, at the same time. Rather it means that at least a subset of the people have the same information available about key components of battlespace awareness in a timely manner. The effect is that they share a common perception of the situation. This common perception enables better communication and mutually supporting actions. 71 Sarah Cliffe, “Knowledge Management: The Well-Connected Business,” Harvard Business Review 76:4 (July–August 1998), 17–21. 72 Air Force Space Command/Space Warfare Center, Information Briefing on Capabilities of Space Warfare Center/ Shield Program, Colorado Springs, CO, 1998. 73 Sensor-to-Shooter C4 Battle Management, Final Report (Washington, DC: C4ISR Decision Support Center and Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for C4 Systems, April 1, 1999). 74 William K. Stevens, “Naval Simulation System: Representation of Network Centric Warfare Concepts and Architectures,” Proceedings of the SMi Conference on Network Centric Warfare, June 23-24, 1999, London. 75 Andy McNab, Bravo Two Zero, New York, Island Books, 1994, 25-28. 76 See U.S. Marine Corps, Beyond C2: A Concept for Comprehensive Command and Coordination of the Marine Air- Ground Task Force (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, June 1998). 77 David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, “Working Bibliography,” Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), 333–381; and Tom Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998). Also, visit the Santa Fe Institute Internet homepage at www.santafe.edu 78 The word “system” here should not be taken to mean computer systems, but refers to a collection of interacting individuals and organizations, along with their processes and tools. 79 VAdm Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, and John J. Garstka, “Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” Proceedings of the Naval Institute 124:1 (January 1998), 28–35. 80 Knowledge and Speed: The Annual Report on the Army After Next Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army, July 1997. 81 John A. Tirpak, “Deliberate Force,” Air Force 80:10 (October 1987). 82 Tempo here refers to the pace of the engagement, how fast decisions are made and acted upon, and how many simultaneous decision/action threads can be concurrent. Operating tempo is a different term that has been used to describe the utilization of equipment. A high operating tempo means that the useful life (in calendar time) of a piece of equipment will reduce and/or increase maintenance costs. 83 Maneuver also includes being put in the right place the first time. 84 “The Cooperative Engagement Capability,” Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 16:4 (1995), 377–396. 85 Sensor to Shooter III: Precision Engagement C4ISR Architecture Analysis, Final Report (Washington, DC: C4ISR Decision Support Center and Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for C4 Systems, June 15, 1997). 86 VAdm Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, and John J. Garstka, “Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” Proceedings of the Naval Institute 124:1 (January 1998), 28–35. 87 Interview of MG William S. Wallace, CG 4th ID, USA, Fort Hood, TX, January 20, 1999. 88 VAdm Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, Written testimony to hearing on Defense Information Superiority and Information Assurance— Entering the 21st Century, held by House Armed Services Committee, subcommittee on military research and development and subcommittee on military procurement, February 23, 1999. 89 BG William L. Bond, USA, Army Digitization Overview, Briefing to Dr. Jacques Gansler, USD (A&T), at the Pentagon, Arlington, VA, on May 20, 1998. 90 BG William L. Bond, USA, Military CIS ’98, Briefing to Dr. Jacques Gansler, USD (A&T), at the Pentagon, Arlington, VA, on April 20, 1998. 91 http://efx.acc.af.mil, updated 01/21/99. 92 Smart Card in Cobra Gold ’98: Business Case Analysis— Final Report, Department of Defense Smart Card Technology Office, January 1999. [Report available at www.dmdc.osd.mil/ smartcard]. 93 Harlan Ullman, James Wade, Jr. et al., Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996). 94 Artificial because the limits are the result of how we choose to distribute responsibility and utilize information rather than the results of information availability and quality. 95 Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage, Public AffairsTM, 1998. 96 LTG Douglas D. Buchholz, USA, Written testimony to hearing on defense transformation, held by Senate Armed Services Committee, subcommittee on airland forces, March 4, 1998. 97 VAdm Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, and John J. Garstka, “Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” Proceedings of the Naval Institute 124:1 (January 1998), 28–35. 98 Michael S. Frankel and Robert H. Gormley, “Achieving Information Dominance: The Integrated Information Infrastructure—A Vision for the 21st Century,” SRI International Study Report, September 17, 1998. 99 CISCO Internetwork Operating System—Release 12.0, CISCO Systems, Copyright 1989–1998. 100 Website for Report of President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, [www.rstcorp.com/ieee/archives], March 1999. 101 Lt.Gen. John L. Woodward, USAF, Written testimony to hearing on Defense Information Superiority and Information Assurance—Entering the 21st Century, held by House Armed Services Committee, subcommittee on military research and development and subcommittee on military procurement, February 23, 1999. 102 That is, they no longer result from a directed search for an improved capability to fill a perceived existing or projected operational shortfall (e.g., more accurate, longer range weapons, stealth technology, improved armor). 103 AFCEA Study Team, Evolutionary Acquisition Study (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA, June 7, 1993). 104 Ibid. 105 David S. Alberts, Lessons Learned from ISX 1.1, AIAA Joint Experiment Task Force Briefing, January 28, 1999. 106 These ideas were developed by an AIAA Task Force on C2 Experimentation. 107 Sensor to Shooter III: Precision Engagement C4ISR Architecture Analysis, Final Report (Washington, DC: C4ISR Decision Support Center and Joint Chiefs of Staff Directorate for C4 Systems, June 15, 1997). 108 Joseph A. Welch, Jr., “State of the Art of C2 Assessment,” Proceedings for Quantitative Assessment of the Utility of Command and Control System, MTR 80W00025 (January 1980), 11. 109 Adm Archie R. Clemins, USN, “Naval Simulation System (NSS): An Assessment of IT-21 Warfighting Value-Added,” Briefing, January 5, 1999. 110 Measuring the Effects of Network-Centric Warfare (Draft, Unpublished), Office of the Secretary of Defense (Net Assessment), Pentagon, Arlington, VA. 111 Obviously, at any given point in time, we need to settle in on the tasks to be accomplished, associated doctrine, and a set of systems. However, a significant amount of effort needs to be devoted to developing new approaches and systems if we are to adopt NCW and that we will, in future, evolve these far more rapidly than we evolve current practices and systems. Therefore, our approach to education and training needs to be adapted to the task of developing NCW MCPs and evolving them. 112 U.S. Air Force, The Army Air Forces in World War II—Vol I: Plans and Operations, January 1939–August 1942 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 666–668.