# Alexander of Aphrodisias (c.150-210) Alexander of Aphrodisias, the most famous commentator on [Aristotle](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/aristotle/), wrote 500 years after Aristotle's death, at a time when Aristotle and Plato were rather forgotten minor philosophers in the age of Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. He defended a view of [moral responsibility](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/responsibility.html) we would call [_libertarianism_](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/libertarianism.html) today. Greek philosophy had no precise term for "free will" as did Latin (_liberum arbitrium_ or _libera voluntas_). The discussion was in terms of [responsibility](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/responsibility.html), what "[depends on us](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/up_to_us.html)" (in Greek _ἐφ ἡμῖν_). Alexander believed that Aristotle was not a strict determinist like the Stoics, and Alexander himself argued that some events do not have _predetermined_ causes. In particular, he held that man is responsible for self-caused decisions, and can choose to do or not to do something. This appears to be not very different from the Stoic [Chrysippus](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/chrysippus/)' idea that one can assent or dissent to an action. Chrysippus said actions are [pre-determined](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/determinism.html) (fated) but not [necessitated](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/necessity.html). Alexander denied three things - necessity (ἀνάγκη), the [foreknowledge](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/determinisms/religious/) of fated events that was part of the Stoic identification of God and Nature, and [determinism](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/determinism.html) in the sense of a sequence of causes that was laid down beforehand (προκαταβεβλημένος) or _predetermined_ by antecedents (προηγουμένος). Alexander on Chance Most of the ancient thinkers recognized the obvious difficulty with [chance](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/chance.html) (or an [uncaused cause](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/causa_sui.html)) as the source of human freedom. Both Aristotle and Alexander describe chance (ἡ τύχη) as a "cause obscure to human reason" > τί γὰρ ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν οἱ τὴν τύχην καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον ἀιτιάν ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ. > (_De Fato_, VIII, 174.1) Alexander makes it clear that the role of chance is to break the causal chain of determinism. If this means that some things happen at random and "for no reason" (μάτην) then so be it. And the randomness is ontological, not merely the result of human ignorance. Alexander is not being original here. He is reading Aristotle as denying the Leucippean [necessity](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/necessity.html). [Epicurus](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/epicurus/) denies necessity even more clearly with his "swerve." Leucippus said, > Nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity. > > οὐδὲν χρῆμα μάτην γίνεται, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ λόγου τε καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης Aristotle clearly accepts that things happen at random. In his Metaphysics he makes the case for [chance](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/chance.html) as an uncaused cause ([causa sui](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/causa_sui.html)). > Nor is there any definite cause for an accident (συμβεβηκός), but only chance (τυχόν), namely an indefinite (ἀόριστον) cause. > > οὐδὲ δὴ αἴτιον ὡρισμένον οὐδὲν τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἀλλὰ τὸ τυχόν: τοῦτο δ' ἀόριστον. > (Metaphysics, Book V, 1025a25) Without such indefinite (uncaused) causes, everything would happen by [necessity](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/necessity.html). > It is obvious that there are principles and causes which are generable and destructible apart from the actual processes of generation and destruction; for if this is not true, everything will be of necessity: that is, if there must necessarily be some cause, other than accidental, of that which is generated and destroyed. Will _this_ be, or not? Yes, if _this_ happens; otherwise not. > (Metaphysics, Book VI, 1027a29) For Alexander, as for Aristotle, a random event "for no reason" provides a fresh start or new beginning (ἀρχή) of a causal chain (ἄλυσις) that can not be traced back indefinitely. This effectively puts an end to the Stoic ideas of foreknowledge and _pre_-determination. These new beginnings are associated with chance (τύχη) and happen by themselves (αῦτόματος) But Alexander does not _equate_ a fresh start with a decision, which would lead to the randomness objection in the [standard argument against free will](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/standard_argument.html) that the Stoics mistakenly leveled against Epicurus. Fresh starts of new causal chains merely create [alternative possibilities](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/possibilities.html) for [deliberation](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/de-liberation.html). Alexander on Doing Otherwise Alexander says that the Stoic assent (συγκατάθεσις) requires a choice after deliberating (βουλεύεσθαι) among [alternative possibilities](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/possibilities.html). (_De Fato_, XIV, 184.13) If Stoic pre-determinism is true and there was but a single choice, men would deliberate "for no reason" (μάτην). (_De Fato_, XI-XII) [Chrysippus](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/chrysippus/) calls assent a choice (προαίρεσισ). Perhaps inconsistently with his Stoic doctrine of fate, Chrysippus thinks alternatives are possible in some sense. Alexander says that what gives man the power of a rational assent is the existence of new beginnings. He goes to the extreme of making this the essence of humanity (sounding very Hegelian), > To be rational (λογικῷ) is nothing other than to be the origin (ἀρχή) of one's actions. > (_De Fato_, XIV, 184.15) > > For man is the origin (ἀρχή) and cause (αίτια) of actions that happen through him (δι’ αὐτοῦ) > (_De Fato_, XV, 185.11) Alexander says that these origins allow agents to [do otherwise](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/otherwise.html) in the same circumstances (τῶν αὐτῶν περιεστώτων) at another time (ἄλλοτε). (_De Fato_, XV, 185.8) [Doing otherwise](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/otherwise.html) requires the existence of real [alternative possibilities](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/possibilities.html). Unfortunately, Alexander does not see that the role of chance is merely to generate these possibilities, creating new causal chains which can be evaluated for the best choice of action. Alexander on the Causal Chain of the Stoics (R. W. Sharples translation) > [The Stoics] say that this universe, which is one and contains in itself all that exists, and is organised by a Nature which is alive, rational and intelligent, possesses the organisation of the things that are, which is eternal and progresses according to a certain sequence and order; the things which come to be first are causes for those after them, and in this way all things are bound together with one another. Nothing comes to be in the universe in such a way that there is not something else which follows it with no alternative and is attached to it as to a cause; nor, on the other hand, can any of the things which come to be subsequently be disconnected from the things which have come to be previously, so as not to follow some one of them as if bound to it. But everything which has come to be is followed by something else which of necessity depends on it as a cause, and everything which comes to be has something preceding it to which it is connected as a cause. For nothing either is or comes to be in the universe without a cause, because there is nothing of the things in it that is separated and disconnected from all the things that have preceded.  > > a single uncaused event would make the universe collapse > > For the universe would be torn apart and divided and not remain single for ever, organised according to a single order and organisation, if any causeless motion were introduced; and it would be introduced, if all the things that are and come to be did not have causes which have come to be beforehand [and] which they follow of necessity. And they say that for something to come to be without a cause is similar to, and as impossible as, the coming to be of something from what is not. The organisation of the whole, which is like this, goes on from infinity to infinity evidently and unceasingly. > (_De Fato_, XXII, 191.32-192.18) > > the famous "causal chain" > > ...all the things that are become causes of some of the things after them, and that in this way things are connected to one another by the later being attached to the earlier in the manner of a chain (ἄλυσις), this being what they propose as the essence as if it were of fate. > (_De Fato_, XXII, 193.5-193.8) Alexander on Logical Determinism The present truth value of statements about the future was an important argument that occupied Aristotle (the "sea-battle" of _de Int_. IX), Epicurus, and the Stoics. It was thought by many to demonstrate the necessity of fate. But it is dismissed as mere words by some commentators, [Carneades](https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/carneades/), for example. Alexander says those who make this argument are childish or joking, and do not know what they are talking about. > [The Stoics make] the argument that the proposition 'there will be a sea-battle tomorrow' can be true but not also necessary; for what is necessary is what is always true, but this [proposition] no longer remains true when the sea-battle comes to be; but if this is not necessary, neither is what is signified by it of necessity, [namely] that there will be a sea-battle. But if there will be a sea-battle, but not of necessity (since it is true that there will be a sea-battle, but not [true that there will be a sea-battle] of necessity), clearly [there will be a sea-battle] contingently; and if contingently, the coming-to-be of some things contingently is not done away with by the coming-to-be of all things in accordance with fate. > > But this [is an argument] of those who both jest and do not know what they are talking about. For neither is everything that comes to be of necessity necessary, if what is necessary is the eternal, but what comes to be of necessity has been prevented from being like this by its very coming-to-be; nor is the proposition that asserts this [sc. what comes to be of necessity] necessary, if what is signified by it is not of this sort [sc. necessary]. (For we do not describe every proposition, in which what is necessary is contained, as ipso facto] necessary; for it is not in this way that it is judged that a proposition is necessary, but by its not being able to change from being true to being false.) > > If then [the proposition that asserts what comes to be of necessity] is not necessary, it has not at all been prevented from being true, just as 'there will be a sea-battle tomorrow'. For, [even] if [when] stated as [something] necessary it is not true because of the addition of the necessary, if it does not become necessary by the addition of 'of necessity' it will still be true in the same way as [the proposition] uttered without this addition. But if this is true, when the next day arrives the proposition that 'a sea-battle came to be of necessity' will be true; and if of necessity, not contingently. > > And indeed, if 'there will be a sea-battle tomorrow' is true, it will always be the case that a sea-battle came to be in accordance with fate, if indeed all the things that come to be are in accordance with fate. But if in accordance with fate, unalterably, and if unalterably, it cannot not come to be, and it is impossible for that not to come to be which cannot come to be; and how can we say that that for which it is impossible not to come to be can also not come to be, since it is necessary for that to come to be for which it is impossible not to come to be? So all the things that come to be in accordance with fate will be of necessity, according to them, and not also contingently, as they say in jest. > (_De Fato_, X, 177.7-178.8)